糖心原创

Title:  "Deceptive Counterfeits and Consumer Protection" (with Johannes Johnen and Gianmarco Luu)

Abstract: Deceptive counterfeits—fake products that consumers purchase unintentionally—are an increasing concern in e-commerce, posing risks to consumers. Particularly dangerous examples include counterfeit pharmaceuticals, fertilizers, electronics, and automotive parts; they also harm consumers through the absence of post-purchase services (returns, warranties, liability, etc.). We develop a model in which some consumers mistakenly believe fake products are genuine. Our first contribution is to introduce a framework where some consumers are harmed by fakes directly through unintentional purchases - the first model to directly analyze how deceptive counterfeits harm consumers. The extent of unintentional purchases depends on the degree of competition between counterfeit products and the authentic brand. The model captures that fakes harm consumers directly in two ways that classic models typically cannot: (i) consumers may suffer ex-ante harm in the sense that prices may not be low enough to compensate for the risk of fakes, and (ii) consumers can be worse off when fakes are active in the market. We analyze two enforcement strategies: persecuting counterfeit sellers and providing authenticity aids. The effectiveness of these strategies depends on whether the brand competes for deceivable consumers. When a brand chooses to compete in this segment, both the brand and counterfeits offer the same price range. In such cases, authenticity aids can backfire—by shifting equilibrium prices, they may increase unintentional counterfeit purchases and prices. Conversely, when a brand does not compete for deceivable consumers—as in traditional counterfeit markets where fakes are more easily recognized—authenticity aids reduce counterfeit purchases. These findings highlight the importance of distinguishing between deceptive and non-deceptive counterfeits when designing effective anti-counterfeit policies. Finally, we study the incentives of a platform to fight deceptive fakes, arguing that more established platforms may have stronger incentives to protect consumers.