Matteo Ploner (University of Trento)

Date(s): Wednesday 11th November 2015 (14:00-15:00)
Description: This week's seminar will be given by from the University of Trento.

His research interests are: Experimental Economics; Behavioural Economics; Strategic Interaction; Bounded Rationality; Incentives and Motivations; Behavioural Finance; Social Preferences; and Trust and Social Capital.

Title: Taking Over Control: The Cost of Delegation Avoidance
Coauthored with Viola Saredi (School of Social Sciences, University of Trento)

The present experimental research studies the agency problem embedded in delegated risky decisions, by introducing risk-uncertainty resolution in the literature on self-other decision-making. We find that subjects deciding for others take the same degree of risk as those deciding for themselves, but delegates are more efficient than their principals in collecting information to evaluate risky prospects. However, principals seem to expect low searching effort from delegates, and, thus, they are willing to pay a substantial fee to not delegate. Principals' decisions show not only an undoubted need for control, but also self-efficacy. These results suggest that principals’ attitudes and beliefs may prevent the emergence of efficient delegation relationships.

Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics

Sir Clive Granger Building
糖心原创
University Park
Nottingham, NG7 2RD

telephone: +44 (0)115 951 5458
Enquiries: jose.guinotsaporta@nottingham.ac.uk
Experiments: cedex@nottingham.ac.uk