糖心原创

Discerning Efficiency Shortfalls Without Knowing Valuations

Abstract: Laboratory experiments employing an induced-values methodology often report on allocative efficiencies observed. That methodology requires experimenters know subjects’ motivations precisely, questionable in laboratory experiments, impossible in field experiments. Allocative efficiency implies a hypothetical costless aftermarket would be inactive. An allocation mechanism’s outcome is defined to be behaviourally efficient if an appropriate aftermarket is actually appended to the mechanism and measures at most a negligible size of remaining mutually beneficial gains. I specify methodological requirements for an appropriate aftermarket. A first demonstration observes significantly larger behavioral inefficiencies in second- than in first-price auctions. A simple field demonstration indicates when a public-good increase can be observed to cover marginal cost to subjects’ mutual benefit, without knowing valuations. A wide variety of empirical economic-policy studies can utilize this methodology to observe comparative evidence of alternative policies’ allocative efficiency shortfalls.

Keywords: behavioral efficiency, aftermarkets,field experiment methodology, allocative efficiency, empirical political economy, valuation revelation